State of Corporate Governance in Arab Countries: An Overview by Harabi, Najib
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
State of Corporate Governance in Arab
Countries: An Overview
Najib Harabi
University of Applied Sciences, Northwestern Switzerland
15. February 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4566/
MPRA Paper No. 4566, posted 22. August 2007
 1
 
 
 
 
State of Corporate Governance in Arab Countries: An 
Overview 
 
 
 
 
 
Preliminary Version 
 
            
            February 15, 2007 
 
 
 
Dr. Najib Harabi* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Professor of Economics at the University of Applied Sciences, Northwestern 
Switzerland 
Email: najib.harabi@fhnw.ch 
 
 
 2
Abstract: Despite the diversity of the region, all Arab countries are currently facing the 
same major challenge of accelerating job creation to reduce double digit unemployment 
rates that threaten their social cohesion. After very high growth rates in the sixties and 
seventies, often fueled by massive public investments, growth in the region has been 
weak for the past two decades.  With the failure of public policies to sustain high growth 
over time, all of the region’s governments have embarked on a series of reforms to 
promote private sector-led economic strategies.  
Despite successes in first generation macroeconomic reforms (including macro-economic 
stabilization and price and trade liberalization), Arab governments have not succeeded in 
putting in place an environment conducive to a strong and sustainable growth of the 
private sector. Most private sector development indicators rank Arab countries behind the 
other regions of comparable income. Their ability to attract rising worldwide FDI flows 
in the nineties has also been week, despite the region’s high potential and its proximity to 
major OECD markets. 
The relatively poor overall performance of the private sector is a complex phenomenon 
and has therefore multiple causes.  While the investment climate constraints to business 
development in the Arab region are well documented in the several Business Climate 
Surveys of the World Bank and other national and international organizations, much less 
is known on other impediments to private sector development, such as the state of 
corporate ownership and the nature of corporate governance and its enforcement 
mechanisms.  
The purpose of this paper is to assess the state of corporate governance as a major factor 
affecting the growth performance of the private sector in MENA countries. For this 
purpose both country-specific assessments, carried out by World Bank-IMF teams (so-
called ROSC’s assessments) and focus-group discussions that took place in four regional 
conferences have been synthesized. Strengths and weaknesses of corporate governance in 
selected Arab countries have been highlighted. One major key finding is that the legal 
and regulatory frameworks of the assessed Arab countries are largely compliant with the 
OECD Principles of corporate governance. However, practices are not. The difficulty of 
the assessments is to reflect properly the discrepancies between the letter of the law and 
compliance. It should be emphasized that the World Bank-IMF assessments focus on 
listed companies. No-listed firms, especially SME, family-owned firms and State-owned 
enterprises that make up to 98% of all firms, are not subject to assessments. 
 
Another key finding that emerged from our reviewing of the regional conferences on 
corporate governance is that corporate governance issues have not been ignored in public 
debates in the MENA region. Practitioners from capital markets, banks, public and 
private sector representatives and other civil society groups have accepted the need to 
address corporate governance reforms as one of the crucial topics affecting the economic 
growth and development of firms, industries and whole economies in their region. 
Several meetings and conferences at the national and regional level have taken place. 
Appropriate and up-to-date recommendations regarding corporate governance reform in 
the MENA region have been adopted in those events. It is now up to the decision makers 
at all levels to implement those recommendations.       
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State of Corporate Governance in Arab Countries: An 
Overview 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Despite the diversity of the region, all Arab countries are currently facing the same  major 
challenge of accelerating  job creation to reduce double digit unemployment rates that 
threaten their social cohesion. After very high growth rates in the sixties and seventies, 
often fueled by massive public investments, growth in the region has been weak for the 
past two decades.  With the failure of public policies to sustain high growth over time, all 
of the region’s governments have embarked on a series of reforms to promote private 
sector-led economic strategies.  Despite successes in first generation macroeconomic 
reforms (including macro-economic stabilization and price and trade liberalization), Arab 
governments have not succeeded in putting in place an environment conducive to a 
strong and sustainable growth of the private sector.   
 
Progress in second generation structural reforms of the microeconomic environment of 
firms has been much slower, and proved to be more difficult to implement.  Whether on 
trade reform (particularly the customs administration, trade finance and trade facilitation 
and logistics), the labor markets (its rigidity and the inadequacy of skills to market 
demand), the financial markets (access to bank finance, non-bank financial instruments, 
credit reporting institutions, etc.), the administrative bottlenecks (in particular entry and 
exit legislation), the reform of the state-owned enterprise sector, the functioning of the 
judiciary; in all of these areas, Arab countries clearly lag behind, especially when 
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compared to middle-income countries. Most private sector development indicators rank 
Arab countries behind the other regions of comparable income. Their ability to attract 
rising worldwide FDI flows in the nineties has also been week, despite the region’s high 
potential and its proximity to major OECD markets. 
 
The result of this poor investment climate is that private investment (whether domestic or 
foreign) has overall been too low to create enough jobs and spur growth.  Moreover, there 
is ample evidence that these constraints to doing business are hurting more the smaller 
enterprises and act as major barriers to entry for new firms to emerge.  The most visible 
consequence of this is the particularly skewed size-distribution of firms that is common 
to all countries in the region and, for this matter, to most developing countries.  In Arab 
countries, the enterprise sector is invariably dominated by a small number of large, 
family-owned business groups, which coexist with a large number of small and micro- 
enterprises.  Only very few of the later grow to become middle-sized enterprises that are 
able to compete on a scale large enough to threaten the large firms’ oligopolies.  For 
those countries which are late comers to the liberalization reforms1, one should add to 
these two groups the large State-owned enterprises.   
 
Given the poor enforcement of regulation and competition policies – when they exist -, it 
is most likely that these business groups engage in monopolistic pricing.2  The dominance 
of these types of firms in the region raises with respect to the overall private sector 
development at least three concerns: 
                                                 
1 This group of countries would include Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Yemen.   
2 To our knowledge, there has not been a careful study yet of the competitive behavior of the few large 
firms that dominate the private sector in MENA.   
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• First, the ownership structure of these business groups may have adverse effects on 
their management and performance, for corporate governance arguments, as we will 
describe below.  These are usually family-owned groups (with single or multiple 
shareholders), that are involved in different industries.  Key to private sector 
development is the creation of favorable conditions for an optimal allocation of 
capital and other factors of production.  The issues of corporate ownership structure 
and related corporate governance mechanisms are in this respect critical.  The 
questions of who owns and control firms, how these firms are governed and how 
those issues affect the performance of firms are central for understanding the growth 
process of the whole private sector. 
 
• Second, the market-power position of some of these large groups may self-sustain and 
be reinforced by acting as barriers to entry for small would-be competitors.  Not only 
can they have economies of scale in some sectors, but they often have acquired 
competitive advantages in:  i) access to finance, through arm-length relations with 
banks.  The banking sector is usually not competitive enough for banks to try to enter 
the small firms segment.  Competition among banks is usually limited to servicing 
these large corporate groups, reinforcing the inherent inefficiencies of the credit 
markets; ii) distribution, by either controlling directly or through alliances with large 
distribution networks; iii) their relation with the public administrations.  Given their 
size, these firms usually benefit from a better business environment than smaller 
firms.  This is particularly the case in the dealings with the various public 
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administrations (with which they often have arms-length relations), which are usually 
a major hassle for small firms.  It can also translate in preferential access to public 
procurement contracts. 
 
• Third, the large business groups often have close relations with the political sphere3, 
and have the political power to influence policy-decision making on business 
regulation and reform priorities.  This is the State or regulatory capture argument. 
 
In sum, the relatively poor overall performance of the private sector and the particularly 
skewed size-distributions of Arab corporations are complex phenomena and have 
therefore multiple causes.  While the investment climate constraints to business 
development in the Arab region are well documented in the several Business Climate 
Surveys of the World Bank and other national and international organizations, much less 
is known on other impediments to private sector development, such as the state of 
corporate ownership and the nature of corporate governance and its enforcement 
mechanisms.  
In this paper I will focus on the issue of the state of corporate governance in Arab 
countries. Section 2 sets out the conceptual framework. Section 3 deals with the question 
of why corporate governance is important for the economic development of Arab 
countries. Section 4 documents the current state of corporate governance in Arab 
countries, using both country-specific assessments and material from regional roundtable 
                                                 
3 Sometimes directly because of their size and the consequently high “political market power”, but also for 
the same reason they have been able to grow big (i.e.  their influence on the political sphere or their 
relations with the political leaders is often the precise reason they have been able to benefit from de facto 
monopolistic situations, and grow their businesses). 
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discussions. Section 4 summarizes the paper and draws conclusions for policy makers in 
the Arab region.    
2. Conceptual Framework 
 
Definitions of corporate governance vary widely. At the most basic level “a corporate 
governance problem arises whenever an outside investor whishes to exercise control 
differently from the manager in charge of the firm.” (Becht et al.  2003). Corporate 
governance is thus “concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among 
dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interests between various 
corporate claimholders.” (Becht et al. 2003) 
   
Under a broader definition, corporate governance would include the relationship between 
shareholders, creditors and corporations; between financial markets, institutions and 
corporations; and between employees and corporations. Corporate governance would also 
encompass the issue of corporate social responsibility, including such aspects as the 
dealings of the firm with respect to culture and the environment. 
 
According to a survey of the finance and corporate law literature “mandatory governance 
rules (as required by stock exchanges, legislatures, courts or supervisory authorities) are 
necessary for the main reasons: first, to overcome the collective action problem resulting 
from the dispersion among shareholders and second, to ensure that the interests of all 
constituencies are represented. In deed, other constituencies besides shareholders face the 
same basic collective action problem. Corporate bondholders are also dispersed and their 
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collective action problems are only imperfectly resolved through trust agreements or 
consortia or in bankruptcy courts. In large corporations employees and clients may face 
similar collective problems, which again are imperfectly resolved by unions or consumer 
protection organizations.”  (Becht et al. (2003: 17). 
   
In order to mitigate shareholders’ collective action problems, the following five major 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms have been used in practice and analyzed in 
the literature4: 
1. “Election of a board of directors representing shareholders’ interests, to which the 
CEO is accountable. 
2. When the need arises, a takeover or proxy fight launched by a corporate raider who 
temporarily concentrates voting power (and or ownership) in his hands to resolve a 
crisis, reach an important decision or remove an inefficient manager.  
3. Active and continuous monitoring by a larger blockholder, who could be a wealthy 
investor or a financial intermediary, such as a bank, a holding company or a pension 
fund.    
4. Alignment of managerial interests with investors through executive compensation 
contracts. 
5. Clearly defined fiduciary duties for CEOs together with class- action suits that either 
block corporate decisions that go against investor’s interests, or seek compensation 
for past actions that have harmed their interests.” (Becht et al.  2003:18).   
 
                                                 
4 Becht et al (2003) provided a survey of both the theoretical and empirical literature on the five corporate 
governance mechanisms listed here.  
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In addition to investigating these mechanisms of corporate governance, one has to look  
into the question of how these mechanisms are really enforced, especially in the 
institutionally week context of developing countries.  Berglof and Claessens (2003) 
consider several ways of classifying the issues related to enforcement.  One distinction is 
between private and public enforcement mechanisms.  Private initiatives to enforce 
contracts are critical to the functioning of any economy and can be outside of the legal 
system.  These initiatives can be unilateral, bilateral and multilateral.  Such private 
ordering among agents is different from private enforcement of public law.  Laws can be 
enforced through private means, such as litigation by individuals, or by public 
enforcement.  In the typical environment of most developing and transition countries the 
private mechanisms are - according to Berglof and Claessens (2003) - more effective than 
public forms of enforcement. 
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Instead of focusing on the legal mechanisms via which equity and debt holders seek to 
exert corporate control, other economists such as Alchian (1950) stress that (output and 
input) market competition forces firms to minimize costs, including the adoption of 
corporate control mechanisms that minimize the cost of raising external finance.  
Nevertheless, in their extensive survey, Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 738) conclude that 
although “… product market competition is probably the most powerful force toward 
economic efficiency in the world, we are skeptical that it alone can solve the problem of 
corporate governance.” In other words market competition does not solve the collective 
action problem related to corporate governance. In this regards regulatory rules have to 
be mandatory, as mentioned above5. 
 
Following this basic insight, several national and international, private and public 
organizations have in deed developed regulatory rules of corporate governance and tried 
to use them for their specific purposes. In this respect, the OECD Principles of corporate 
governance have been outstanding as an international benchmark. A first version of those 
principles was published in 1998, a reviewed and revised version of them is now 
available (since 2005). 
  
The OECD Principles are general guidelines for regulating the entry, ongoing obligations 
and exit of companies to and from equity markets. The Principles were devised with four 
                                                 
5 For further discussion of why markets alone are insufficient to ensure sound corporate governance, see for 
example Glasser/Johnson/Shleifer (2000) and Stiglitz (1998).  
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fundamental concepts in mind: responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency. 
The Principles allow for diversity of rules and regulations. 
 
The OECD Principles are primarily concerned with listed companies. They are organized 
into five sections, (1) the rights of shareholders, (2) the equitable treatment of 
shareholders, (3) the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, (4) disclosure and 
transparency and (5) the responsibility of the board.  
 
The OECD Principles state that the board members are accountable to shareholders and 
to the company. Accountability to shareholders means equal treatment of majority and 
minority shareholders. Accountability to the company means that directors must ensure 
that the company complies with existing laws and regulations, such as tax, labor, health 
and safety laws, equal opportunity, environmental legislation and competition law. 
 
The OECD Principles stress that stakeholders, in particular creditors, employees and 
consumers, play an integral part in shaping the decisions of a company. Principle III 
states that “… the corporate governance framework should encourage active co-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs and the sustainability of 
financially sound enterprises”. The full social responsibility debate goes beyond the 
scope of this report. 
 
In particular, corporate governance deals with the checks and balances that need to be put 
in place to cope with the problems resulting from the separation of management and 
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ownership of corporations (so-called “principle-agents problems”). Board members and 
management need to have enough independence to manage the company’s affairs as they 
best see fit without undue interference from outsiders, as long as they do it prudently, 
with diligence and care, and in the interest of shareholders. Checks and balances are 
necessary to ensure accountability, since people are likely to manage their own affairs 
more carefully than those of others.  
 
The OECD Principles are non–biding for OECD-countries. The World Bank has used 
them, however, in order to assess the state of corporate governance in some of its 
member countries, including Arab countries. For this purpose it has produced a 
questionnaire in the form of a template (the “Template) that is structured along the five 
chapters of the OECD Principles.  
 
The objective of having the Template is to facilitate the gathering of information 
necessary to formulate a diagnostic of the institutional framework underlying corporate 
governance, as well as prevailing practices and enforcement. For each OECD Principle, a 
set of questions have been prepared to assess the compliance of the country under 
assessment. Questions have been drafted so that they can be answered by “yes” or “no” 
as often as possible, to allow benchmarking. 
  
The Template includes a section on the ownership structure of the assessed country, since 
this is an important determinant of corporate governance practices. It endeavors to 
identify pyramid structures, cross shareholdings and business groups; it gathers 
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information on the divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights. While the 
OECD Principles are mainly concerned with the rights of shareholders and stakeholders, 
disclosure and the responsibilities of insiders, the template also addresses the issue of 
institutional capacity.  
 
The OECD Principles of corporate governance will be used in this report for assessing 
the state of corporate governance in those Arab countries, for which systematic 
assessments exist, namely for Morocco, Egypt and Jordan. Before doing this in section 4, 
I will try to answer briefly, why corporate governance is important for their economic 
development.  
 
 3.  Corporate Governance and Economic Development 
 
The economic literature has identified several channels through which corporate 
governance affects the economic performance of firms, markets and whole economies6: 
 
1. “The first is the increased access to external financing by firms. This in turn can lead 
to larger investment, higher growth and greater employment creation. 
2. The second channel is a lowering of the cost of capital and associated higher firm 
valuation. This makes more investments attractive to investors, also leading to growth 
and more employment. 
                                                 
6 For a survey of the literature regarding corporate governance and development see Claessens (2003) and 
Oman (2001).  
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3. The third channel is better operational performance through better allocation of 
resources and better management. 
4. Fourth, good corporate governance can be associated with a reduced risk of 
financial crises. This is particularly important, as financial crises can have large 
economic and social costs. 
5. Fifth, good corporate governance can mean generally better relationship with all 
stakeholders. This helps improve social and labor relationships and aspects such as 
environmental protection.” (Claessens (2003:14))    
 
 All these channels mater for economic growth of both firms and of economies. As 
Claessens (2003) shows in his survey, there is evidence that documents these channels 
empirically. A few examples follow: 
 
Increased Access to Financing. In countries with strong property rights (strong legal 
foundations of corporate governance) the financial and capital markets are better 
developed. Corporations have therefore better access to financing. Data provided by La 
Porta et al. (1997) suggest first, that the stronger the creditors rights, the greater the depth 
of the financial system (measured as the ratio of private credit to GDP) and second, the 
better the quality of shareholders protection, the larger the country’s stock market. Strong 
regimes of property rights seem to be very important for both credit and stock market 
financing.   There is also evidence that poor corporate governance (and underdeveloped 
financial and legal systems and higher corruption) means (a) the growth rate of the 
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smallest firms is the most adversely affected and (b) less new, and particularly small 
firms, start up (Beck et al.  (2002); Rajan and Zingales (1998)).   
 
In addition, a substantial body of theoretical work suggests that concentrated business 
groups serve as a device through which minority shareholders can be expropriated.  
Pyramidal ownership structures offer one mechanism through which this might happen.  
The ubiquity of pyramids in 27 countries has been established by La Porta et al.  (1999). 
The lack of protection for minority shareholder rights has been argued to impede the 
efficient functioning of financial markets (La Porta et al.  (1998)). The resultant 
inefficiencies in capital markets can prevent the entry of de novo entrepreneurs and thus 
stifle competition.     
 
Higher firm valuation. Besides access to external financing, the quality of the corporate 
governance framework affects the costs of capital and firm valuation; the issues of access 
and costs are, of course, related.  Outsiders are less willing to provide financing and are 
more likely to charge higher rates if they are less assured that they will get an adequate 
rate of return.  There is an empirical evidence for these effects.  La Porta et al.  (2000) 
have shown that the costs of capital seem to be higher and valuation lower in weaker 
property rights countries; this finding has been confirmed by Dyck and Zingales (2002). 
Using recent firm-level data, Klapper/Love (2002) have found that better corporate 
governance is highly correlated with market valuation. Their results suggest that firms 
can partially compensate for ineffective laws and enforcement mechanisms by 
establishing good corporate governance. Investors also seem to apply a discount in their 
 16
valuation for worse corporate governance firms and countries (as documented in a 
McKinsey survey of institutional investors 2001).7   
 
Better operational performance.  Evidence for the US and elsewhere suggests strongly 
that at the firm level, better corporate governance leads not only to improved rates of 
return on equity and higher valuation, but also to higher profits and stronger sales growth 
(Gompers/Ishii/Metrick 2001). Klapper/Love (2002) has also found that good governance 
is positively correlated with operating performance and that this relationship is stronger 
in countries with weaker legal system. Firms with better governance seem to have less 
need to rely on the legal system to resolve governance conflicts. This result is quite 
important for firms operating in countries with weak shareholder protection and poor 
judicial efficiency like the MENA countries.     
 
Reduced risk of financial crises. According to Claessens (2003) “the quality of 
corporate governance can affect firm’s behavior in times of economic shocks and actually 
contribute to the occurrence of financial distress, with economy wide impacts”. In his 
survey of the literature he concludes that good governance can be associated with 
improved risk management, a reduced risk of financial distress and thus an avoidance of 
the costs of bankruptcy. 
 
Better relations with other stakeholders. Good corporate governance can mean 
generally better relationship with all the stakeholders, including banks, bondholders, 
                                                 
7 The results of the McKinsey Survey of institutional investors are available on the Website of the Global 
Corporate Goverance Forum.  
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labor, local and national governments. It helps with social and labor relationships and 
aspects such as the environment.  Equally important are the potential benefits of 
improved corporate governance for overcoming barriers, including the actions of vested 
interests groups, who operate simultaneously in the marketplace, notably as corporate 
insiders and in the sphere of domestic politics.8 
 
In spite of their economic importance, there is no systematic empirical analysis that looks 
at those channels through which corporate governance affects the performance of 
individual firms as well as whole economies in the context of the Arab region.  What is 
available to researchers and policy makers of this region are some attempts of 
qualitatively assessing the state of corporate governance in this region.  
 
4. State of Corporate Governance in Arab Countries 
 
The state of corporate governance in Arab countries will be assessed by using two sets of 
empirical data, both of them are of qualitative nature. The first consists of the official 
World Bank –IMF reports on corporate governance in Morocco (May 2003), Egypt 
(December 2003) and Jordan (June 2004). The second source of information is the 
regional roundtable discussions, organized by international and regional organizations  
(Center for International Private Enterprise, CIPE, OECD, World Bank etc.) 
                                                 
8 These vested interest groups are sometimes called “distributional cartels” (Olson Mansour), because in 
seeking to maintain or increase their share of the country’s wealth (e.g.  market share), they often invest 
significant corporate-controlled (as well as government –controlled) resources not in the creation of new 
wealth but in actions of strategic rivalry among themselves.  Those actions tend to result not in healthy 
inter-firm price competition but in significant wastage and misallocation of a country’s resources.  They 
tend often to reduce aggregate wealth and thus constitute, from society’s point of view, highly negative-
sum games.   
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4.1. Country Studies:  Jordan, Morocco and Egypt 
 
The key findings of the World Bank-IMF assessments have been divided to correspond 
with the five sections of the OECD Principles. Each section highlights deviations from 
the OECD Principles or describes compliance. One major key finding is that the legal and 
regulatory frameworks of the three assessed Arab countries are largely compliant with the 
OECD Principles. However, practices are not. The difficulty of the assessments is to 
reflect properly the discrepancies between the letter of the law and compliance. It should 
be emphasized that the World Bank-IMF assessments focus on listed companies. No-
listed firms, specially SME and family-owned firms that make up to 98% of all firms, are 
not subject to assessments. 
 
Table 1 synthesizes the three individual World Bank-IMF corporate governance 
assessments of Morocco, Jordan and Egypt. Based on that Table and on the underlying 
individual country reports the following findings can be presented: 
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Table 1: Summary of Observance of OECD Corporate Governance Principles in 
Egypt (Eg), Jordan (Jo) and Morocco (Ma) 
Principle Observed Largely 
Observed 
Partially 
Observed 
Materially 
Not 
Observed 
Not 
Observed 
I. The rights of Shareholders 
IA Basic shareholder rights EG Jo, Ma    
IB Rights to participate in     
     fundamental decisions 
 Eg, Jo, Ma    
IC Shareholders AGM rights  Eg, Jo. Ma    
ID Disproportional control   
     disclosure 
 Eg Jo Ma  
IE Control arrangements  
 should be allowed to    
 function 
 Eg Jo Ma  
IF Cost/Benefit to voting   Jo Eg Ma 
II Equitable Treatment of Shareholders  
IIA All shareholders should  
      be treated equally 
 Eg, Ma Jo   
IIB Prohibit insider trading  Jo  Eg Ma  
IIC Board/Mgrs. disclose  
      interests 
 Jo, Eg  Ma  
III. Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
IIIA Stakeholders rights  
       respected 
Jo, Eg   Ma  
IIIB Redress for violation of  
       rights 
Jo, Eg   Ma  
IIIC  Performance  
        enhancement 
Jo, Eg   Ma  
IIID  Access to information Jo Eg, Ma    
IV Disclosure and Transparency 
IVA Disclosure standards  Jo Eg Ma  
IVB Standards of accounting  
       & audit 
Jo Eg  Ma  
IVC Independent audit annually Ma  Jo, Eg   
IVD Fair and timely  
       dissemination 
 Eg, Jo, Ma    
V. Responsibilities of the Board 
VA Acts with due diligence,  
      care 
 Eg, Jo, Ma    
VB Treat all shareholders  
       fairly 
Ma  Jo, Eg   
VC Ensure compliance with  
       law 
 Jo, Eg, Ma    
VD The Board should fulfill  
       certain key functions  
 Jo, Ma Eg   
VE The Board should be able  
      to exercise objective  
     judgment 
  Ma Jo, Eg  
VF Access to information J, E M    
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Legend: 
 
“Observed” means that all essential criteria are met without significant deficiencies 
 
“Largely observed” means only minor shortcomings are observed, which do not raise 
questions about the authorities’ ability and intend to achieve full observance in the short 
term. 
 
“Partially observed” means that while the legal and regulatory framework complies 
with the principle, practices and enforcement diverge. 
 
“Materially not observed” it means that, despite progress, shortcomings are sufficient to 
raise doubts about the authorities’ ability to achieve observance. 
 
“Not observed” means no substantive progress toward observance has been achieved.  
 
Sources: Compiled by the author from World Bank reports (May 2003), (December 
2003) and (June 2004) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
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Section I:  The rights of shareholders 
Principle IA: The corporate governance framework should protect shareholders’ rights. 
Basic shareholders rights include the right to: (1) secure methods of ownership 
registration, (2) convey or transfer shares, (3) obtain relevant information on the 
corporation on a timely and regular basis; (4) participate and vote in general 
shareholder meetings; and (5) elect members of the board; and (6) share in the profits of 
the corporation.  
 
This Principle has been observed in Egypt and largely observed in Jordan and Morocco. 
Registration of shares has historically been the responsibility of the company. This power 
vested in management created difficulties arising from agency problems between 
management and shareholders. In Morocco, for instance, companies can object to or 
block share transfer and ownership registration.    
Principle IB: Shareholders have the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently 
informed on decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes, such as (i) 
amendments to the governing documents of the company, (ii) the authorization of 
additional shares; and (iii) extraordinary transactions that in effect result in the sale of 
the company. 
 
This Principle has been largely observed in the three countries.  
 
Principle IC: Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and vote 
in general shareholder meetings and should be informed of the rules, including voting 
procedures that govern them. (i) Shareholders should be furnished with sufficient and 
timely information concerning the date, location and agenda of general meetings, as well 
as full and timely information regarding the issues to be decided at the meeting. (ii) 
Opportunity should be provided for shareholders to ask questions of the board an to 
place items on the agenda at general meetings, subject to reasonable limitations. (iii) 
Shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and equal effect should be 
given to votes whether cast in person or in absentia. 
 
This Principle has also been largely observed in the three countries. While voting is a 
basic right of ordinary shares in most countries, owners of bearer shares do not have the 
right to vote in Egypt. Furthermore, shareholders who have paid up only 50 or less 
percent of the share issue price have full voting rights in Morocco and Egypt. 
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Principle ID: Capital structure and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to 
obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their equity ownership should be 
disclosed.   
 
This Principle has been largely observed in Egypt, but only partially observed in Jordan, 
while materially not observed in Morocco. Especially in the latter country, where highly 
concentrated ownership structure in form of pyramid structures and cross shareholdings 
exist, it is de facto hard to obtain information about the first level capital structure of a 
listed company.  
 
Principle IE: Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient 
and transparent manner.  
 
The same assessment as before has been found for Principle IE. The three Arab countries 
are characterized by concentrated ownership structures. Ownership concentration implies 
that the corporate takeovers only take place in a friendly environment. 
 
Principle IF: Shareholders, including institutional investors, should consider the costs 
and benefits of exercising their voting rights. 
 
With respect to this Principle, all three countries are not doing well, especially Morocco 
and Egypt. In all three countries there is little shareholder culture. The costs of exercising 
voting rights and the danger of upsetting incumbent management are deemed greater than 
the benefits in the short term. 
 
In sum, the rights of shareholders -as measured by the OECD Principles and assessed by 
World Bank-IMF experts- are best respected in Egypt, followed by Jordan and Morocco. 
It is striking that in Morocco the last three Principles are either materially not observed or 
not observed at all.  
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Section II:  The equitable treatment of shareholders 
 
Principle IIA: The Corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable 
treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All 
shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their 
rights. All shareholders of the same class should be treated equally. (i) Within any class, 
all the shareholders should have the same voting rights. All investors should be able to 
obtain information about the voting rights attached to all classes of shares before they 
purchase. Any changes in voting rights should be subject to shareholder vote. (iii) Votes 
should be cast by custodians or nominees in a manner agreed upon with the share’s 
beneficial owner. 
 
This Principle has been largely observed in Egypt and Morocco, but only partially 
observed in Jordan. 
 
Principle IIB: Insider trading and self-dealing should be prohibited. 
 
It is largely observed in Jordan, partially observed in Egypt and materially not observed 
in Morocco. Despite the fact that insider trading and self-dealing are a criminal offense in 
all three countries, monitoring and detecting remain a problem across the board. The 
securities regulators are generally not equipped to carry out their surveillance activities 
efficiently and depend on a often overburdened, weak or slow court system for 
enforcement. In addition, commercial tribunals are normally weak (lack of qualified 
personal, corruption etc.)  
     
Principle IIC: Members of the board and managers should be required to disclose any 
material interests in transactions or matters affecting the corporation.  
 
This Principle is largely observed in Jordan and Egypt, but materially not observed in 
Morocco. The regulatory framework of these countries usually includes rules and 
regulations for disclosing and monitoring related party transactions and self-dealing. 
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However, disclosure is not always mandatory, or there are no clear rules. In Morocco, 
related party transactions must only be disclosed if they take place under “special 
conditions”.  
 
In all three countries, there is a general concern that existing provisions are not 
consistently adhered to and cannot be enforced in environments often characterized, as 
already mentioned, by pyramid structures, cross shareholdings and a weak judicial 
system. 
 
Section III: The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
Principle IIIA: The corporate governance framework should encourage active 
cooperation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the 
sustainability of financially sound enterprises. The corporate governance framework 
should assure that the rights of stakeholders that are protected by law are respected. 
 
This Principle has been observed in Jordan and Egypt, but materially not observed in 
Morocco.  
 
Principle IIIB: Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should 
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
 
This Principle has been observed in Jordan and Egypt, but materially not observed in 
Morocco.  
 
Principle IIIC: The Corporate governance framework should permit performance-
enhancement mechanisms for stakeholder participation. 
 
This Principle has been observed in Jordan and Egypt, but materially not observed in 
Morocco.  
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Principle IIID: Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they 
should have access to relevant information. 
 
This Principle has been observed in Jordan, but only partially observed in Egypt and 
Morocco.  
 
In general, stakeholders are seldom represented on the board of companies, not only in 
Arab countries, but worldwide. Exceptions are e.g. Germany, China, Austria, Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden and Egypt where employees have the right to elect representatives to 
the (supervisory) board. In Morocco, however, the OECD Principles guiding the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance don’t practically exist.   
 
 Section IV:  Disclosure and Transparency 
Principle IVA: The corporate governance framework should assure that timely and 
accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including 
the financial situation, performance, ownership, and the governance of the company. 
Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on (1) the financial 
and operating results of the company. (2) Company objectives. (3) Major share 
ownership and voting rights. (4) Members of the board and key executives and their 
remuneration. (5) Material foreseeable risk factors. (6) Material issues regarding 
employees and other stakeholders. (7) Governance structures and policies. 
 
Disclosure standards as described in Principle IVA have been largely observed in Jordan, 
partially observed in Egypt, and materially not observed in Morocco.  
 
Principle IVB: Information should be prepared, audited and disclosed in accordance 
with high quality standards of accounting, financial and non-financial disclosure, and 
audit. 
 
High standards of accounting and audit have been observed in Jordan, partially observed 
in Egypt, but not materially observed in Morocco.  
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Principle IVC: An annual audit should be conducted by an independent auditor in order 
to provide an external and objective assurance on the way in which financial statements 
have been prepared and presented. 
 
The Principle of independent annual audit has been observed in Morocco, but only 
partially observed in Jordan and Egypt. 
 
 
Principle IVD: Channels for disseminating information should provide for fair, timely 
and cost-effective access to relevant information by users. 
 
Fair and timely dissemination of information has theoretically been largely observed in 
the three Arab countries. 
 
In sum, in all assessed countries business has traditionally been based on relationship and 
trust. In this business culture corporate information is thought of as a secret. It is accepted 
practice to keep different sets of books, e.g. one for taxes, one for outside investors, and 
one for the majority shareholder. In addition, the notes to the accounts are often only 
available to the public in summary form, if at all. Companies in Morocco and Egypt, for 
instance, limit themselves to the publication of summary financial statements (sometimes 
with partial notes) in the newspaper or legal gazette. 
 
      
Section V: The responsibility of the board 
Principle VA: The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance 
of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s 
accountability to the company and the shareholders. Board members should act on a 
fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in the best interest of 
the company and the shareholders. 
 
That the Board acts with diligence and care etc, this Principle has been largely observed 
in the three countries.   
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Principle VB: Where board decisions may affect different shareholder groups differently, 
the board should treat all shareholders fairly. 
 
This Principle has been observed in Morocco, but partially observed in Jordan and Egypt. 
   
Principle VC: The board should ensure compliance with applicable law and take into 
account the interests of stakeholders. 
 
The Principle that the board should ensure compliance with law etc. has been partially 
observed in all three countries. 
  
Principle VD: The board should fulfill certain key functions, including (1) Reviewing and 
guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, annual budgets and 
business plans; setting performance objectives; monitoring implementation and 
corporate performance and overseeing major capital expenditures, acquisitions and 
divesture. (2) Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key 
executives and overseeing succession planning. (3) Reviewing key executives and board 
remunerations, and ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination process. (4) 
Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of management, board members 
and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in related-party 
transactions. (5) Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial 
reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of 
control are in place, in particular, systems for monitoring risk, financial control, and 
compliance with the law. (6) Monitoring the effectiveness of the governance practices 
under which it operates and making changes as needed. (7) Overseeing the process of 
disclosure and communication. 
 
Principle VD has been largely observed in Jordan and Morocco, but only partially 
observed in Egypt.   
        
Principle VE: The board should be able to exercise objective judgments on corporate 
affairs independent from management: (1) boards should consider assigning a sufficient 
number of non-executive board members capable of exercising independent judgment to 
tasks where there is a potential for conflict of interests. Examples of such key 
responsibilities are financial reporting, nomination, and executive and board 
remuneration. (2) Board members should devote sufficient time to their responsibilities. 
 
The Principle that the board should be able to exercise objective judgment has been only 
partially observed in Morocco, and materially not observed in Jordan and Egypt.   
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Principle VF: In order to fulfill their responsibilities, board members should have access 
to accurate, relevant and timely information. 
  
This Principle has been observed in Jordan and Egypt, and largely observed in Morocco. 
 
 
With respect to the responsibility of the board, the following concluding remarks can be 
made: In the three Arab countries under discussion, companies tend to follow a 
“parliamentarian model“ of board representation, where directors represent the 
constituency that elected them. This model is fundamentally not consistent with the four 
pillars of the OECD Principles discussed above.  
 
In addition to defining strategy, selecting, monitoring and overseeing management is the 
most fundamental function of the board. A board that cannot dismiss management is not 
an effective board. This function requires an independence from management and 
controlling shareholders that is generally lacking in the three countries. In Egypt, Jordan 
and partially Morocco with single tier board structures, the chief executive officer (CEO) 
is also the chairperson of the board. In those countries where ownership is (as already 
mentioned) highly concentrated, this person is often also a representative of the majority 
shareholders. This set-up makes it virtually impossible for outsiders to replace 
management because it would mean firing themselves. Therefore, the board fails in this 
fundamental respect. 
 
In addition to this fundamental problem, another recurring theme on the subject of board 
duties in the Arab region is the lack of training and the limited understanding that 
directors have of corporate governance issues. One possible remedy is the creation of 
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Institutes of Directors for training, dissemination of best practice and issuance of  
guidelines regarding the size of the board, the constitution of committees and other useful 
practices. Following this suggestion, Institutes of Directors have been created in Egypt, 
and Morocco, and a regional institution, Hawkamah Institute for Corporate Governance, 
has been set up in Dubai.    
 
4.2 Regional perspective on corporate governance 
 
In addition to country specific assessments, the results of regional roundtable discussions 
are used here to assess the state of corporate governance in selected Arab countries. As in 
other parts of the world, the issue of corporate governance has been debated throughout 
the MENA region. Especially, private sector groups have undertaken initiatives as early 
as 2001 to address corporate governance in the region. In July 2003, the World Bank’s 
Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF), the Center for international Private 
Enterprise (CIPE) and local partners in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco launched a 
regional initiative to assess the state of corporate governance in MENA. Meetings in 
Lebanon, Morocco and Jordan were attended by representatives from the private and 
public sector, including corporate governance practitioners, auditors and regulatory 
authorities. A regional experts meeting was convened in Cairo in September 2003 to 
discuss regional challenges and trends in corporate governance and to field 
recommendations on implementing corporate governance in MENA9.  
 
                                                 
9 A smaller group of regional experts represented the region at the International Corporate Governance 
Meeting in Paris in November 2003 to review the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance from the 
perspective of developing countries. 
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In addition to the first regional meeting in Cairo, the following regional conferences have 
taken place: 
• Second Middle East and North Africa Regional Corporate Governance Forum: 
Corporate Governance in MENA Countries- Improving Transparency and 
Disclosure. Beirut, Lebanon, June 3-5, 2004 (see conference report by Nasser Saidi 
(2004)). 
• Third Regional Corporate Governance Forum: Private Sector Consultative Meeting.   
January 25, 2005, Amman, Jordan. (see conference report by CIPE, (2005). 
• Fourth Regional Corporate Governance Forum: Towards Sound and Efficient 
Financial Markets and Banking Systems, November 26-27, 2006, Dubai, UAE, 
hosted by Hawkamah Institute for Corporate Governance. 
 
The regional discussions have focused on common regional issues and advanced several 
useful ideas. From the first conference in Cairo the following recommendations can be 
summarized:10   
 
• Implementation and costs: markets in the region are in early stages of development. 
Corporate governance principles should be a vehicle for markets to grow rather than 
a costly impediment for companies to implement. Rules should allow for incentives to 
companies that adhere to corporate standards. 
• Addressing family owned companies: since family companies are the dominant 
characteristic in regional markets, the region should explore how to address family 
                                                 
10see the report by the Global Corporate Governance Forum and the Center for International Private 
Enterprise (CIPE), (2003) on Corporate Governance in Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan, P. 41-43:    
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owned firms and the application of corporate governance principles. Corporate 
governance practices should not be an obstacle for the establishment and 
development of family companies as they represent the backbone of several 
economies in the region. However, there should be clear and enforceable principles 
that protect minority shareholders. 
• Bankruptcy and exit strategy: with exception of few countries in the region11, 
bankruptcy procedures and exit strategy pose a problem for stakeholders and 
shareholders. The region will need to take a critical look at the institutional 
arrangements in which companies could file for bankruptcy or exit the market, while 
keeping the needs and interests of the stakeholders and shareholders in 
consideration. 
• Separation of ownership and control: governance systems in the MENA region are 
insider systems that are characterized by majority and concentrated ownership. In 
these systems, there is no separation of ownership and control. Complete separation 
between ownership and control might not be realistic and it might hinder further 
development of the family business environment. Thus the region should explore 
practical ways to dilute major shareholders voting rights to the extent that provides a 
room for minority shareholders and other stakeholders’ rights.  
• Owner’s wealth and company’s financial position: the region needs to address the 
issue of separating owners’ wealth from the companies’ financial position and 
extracting private benefits from the company such as extending credit to major 
shareholders. 
                                                 
11 Jordan and  Lebanon adopted bankruptcy regulations to protect stakeholders. 
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• Board of directors: a number of reports and codes of corporate governance have 
addressed the issue extensively, especially on family owned firms. Regardless of the 
board structure model (unitary or two-tier), the region should address the issue of 
board independence vis-à-vis a unified clear definition of the non-executive 
director12and the criteria for ensuring independence. Minorities should have the right 
to appoint representatives to the board for better governance. 
• Accounting and auditing practices: the region should address the issue of differences 
in adopting accounting standards across the countries. Thus, unification of 
accounting standards is crucial for better disclosure and transparency. In addition, 
the region should engage the accounting and auditing professions in ensuring 
independent, sound and fair practices within their professions and their clients. 
• Governance Culture: introducing corporate governance as part of the culture of the 
country will constitute a good and practical solution for the problem of ownership-
management mix and it will allow for separate ownership from management, which is 
in the best interest of the company. Authorities in securities markets, whether 
government or private business, should provide training opportunities for companies’ 
management and staff as well as other parties with a view to introducing new 
management techniques and risk assessment methods and strategies. Additionally, 
public governance and corporate governance have to be dealt with jointly and are of 
equal importance. Not only do many enterprises in the region still belong to the state, 
but also public governance had direct repercussions on corporate governance. 
                                                 
12 Definitions among countries differs according to their regulations, example the cas of US versus some 
European countries. 
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• Strict Bank Supervision: the introduction of a two-tired approach to the corporate 
structure of family owned companies, particularly banks, whereby a board of 
commissioners representing the minority would supervise the board to ensure 
transparent dealings. 
• Stages of Development: there should be principles of corporate governance 
applicable to firms at every stage of their development and growth, form homegrown 
business to multinational corporations. 
• Ethics and Incentives: means should be developed for the establishment and 
enforcement of codes of ethics regarding the moral aspect of company operations. 
Operators need to believe in moralities and should be helped for this purpose by 
relevant training and education. The civil society could be the moral qualifier in this 
respect with the support of an incentive system and self-regulation framework. (see 
the report by the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE)/ Global Corporate 
Governance Forum (2003) on Corporate Governance in Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon 
and Jordan, P. 41-43) :    
 
All these recommendations suggest concrete solutions to current practices and trends in 
corporate governance in Arab countries. They came out, as already mentioned, of the first 
regional forum. After this major event, follow up work on corporate governance both 
regionally and within selected Arab countries has been curried out. At the regional level, 
CIPE, with support from the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), has assembled a 
private sector corporate governance advisory board to provide input on corporate 
governance programming for the region as well as coordinate country specific efforts to 
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develop Arab best practice examples on the implementation of corporate governance 
principles. A multi-lingual (Arabic, English, French) website www.hawkama.net  
dedicated to highlight corporate governance best practices in these languages has been 
developed. 
 
More importantly, a second MENA regional corporate governance forum was 
successfully organized in Beirut on June 3-5, 2004. Hosted by local partners (Lebanon 
Corporate Governance Task Force) and Lebanese Transparency Association) and  
supported by various international organizations (Global Corporate Governance Forum, 
the Center for International Private Enterprise, MEPI and OECD), this forum aimed at 
institutionalizing the process, which is important for the region and included a larger 
number of country participants, including states from the Gulf and Tunisia. The 
institutionalization process was reinforced by the participation of regional bodies, 
including the Union of Arab Banks, the Arab Union for Stock Exchanges and the Arab 
Federation of Certified Accountants. 
 
This meeting that concentrated on central dimensions of corporate governance, namely 
disclosure and transparency as well as implementation, has also led to the publication of 
the - already mentioned - second report on corporate governance in MENA countries.  It 
has formulated around 24 recommendations for the regional corporate governance 
agenda. Some of them are similar to those presented above. An emphasis has been put on 
issues related to the implementation of corporate governance principles. To improve the 
functioning of the corporate sector, so the report, “general improvements in the courts, 
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the legal system and the regulatory regime must be made. Private institutions such as 
centralized credit reporting agencies and local credit rating agencies must be put in place” 
(Saidi 2004: 20). 
 
The Third Regional Corporate Governance Forum, held in Amman, Jordan, on January 
25, 2005, was organized by the Center for International Private Entreprise (CIPE), 
together with the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGE), and the OECD. It 
brought together regional private sector associations to highlight regional private sector-
driven initiatives advancing corporate governance reform. Some of the key 
recommendations of this Forum can be summarized as follows: 
• Build a culture of corporate governance in the region, rather than simply create a 
regulatory framework 
• Target SMEs and family-owned businesses in corporate governance reform 
• Build a wider awareness of corporate governance reform in the region 
• Introduce corporate governance into shools’curriculum and raise the next generation 
of leaders 
• Create corporate governance task forces to sustain the momentum of corporate 
governance  
• Increase regional cooperation 
• Promote success stories 
• Increase private sector participation in economic decision-making, including 
corporate governance reform. (see, conference report by CIPE, (2005)). 
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The fourth regional corporate governance conference, tilted “Towards Sound and 
Efficient Financial Markets and Banking Systems”, took place on November 26-27, 
2006, in Dubai, UAE. This conference was completed with the so-called “Dubai 
Declaration on Corporate Governance” which emphasized - among other things- the 
following points: 
• Building on recent efforts, MENA countries need to continue improving the legal and 
regulatory framework underpinning corporate governance. 
• Parallel to strengthening these frameworks, the capacity of supervisors and 
regulators should also be addressed. 
• Self-regulatory measures and corporate governance codes should be developed as a 
complementary mechanism for improving enforcement in the region. 
• The role of a well functioning court system and capacity building for judges cannot 
be overemphasized. 
• MENA board of directors should rely on a sufficient number of independent directors 
and on the establishment of specialized committees in order to act efficiently in the 
interest of the company and all of its shareholders, including the minority 
shareholders. 
• Corporate governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should be addressed as a 
priority, because of the important role they play for MENA economies. 
• Given the preponderance and economic importance of family-owned, small and 
medium-sized enterprises and non-listed companies in MENA, promoting awareness 
of the benefits of better corporate governance practices and the adoption of best 
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practices by the private sector is an imperative for economic development and 
modernization. 
• MENA banks play a dominant role in corporate finance. A shortcoming in the   
governance of banks can lower returns to the bank’s shareholders and can have 
systemic consequences. 
• MENA countries should act to establish effective insolvency systems and provide a 
framework for value maximization and more efficient allocation of capital to 
productive uses. ( see, Dubai Declaration on Corporate Governance, posted on the 
website of Hawkamah Institute for Corporate Governance: www. hawkamah.org) 
 
 
The Dubai Declaration on Corporate Governance also emphasizes the role of 
implementation of concrete measures and action plans for improving corporate 
governance in the region.  
 
Finally, Hawkamah Institute for Corporate Governance, host of the fourth regional 
conference, will review - in co-operation with the MENA OECD Working Group on 
Corporate Governance- the progress achieved in implementing the Declaration. 
 
4. Summary  
 
Despite the diversity of the region, all Arab countries are currently facing the same major 
challenge of accelerating job creation to reduce double digit unemployment rates that 
threaten their social cohesion. After very high growth rates in the sixties and seventies, 
often fueled by massive public investments, growth in the region has been weak for the 
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past two decades.  With the failure of public policies to sustain high growth over time, all 
of the region’s governments have embarked on a series of reforms to promote private 
sector-led economic strategies.  
 
Despite successes in first generation macroeconomic reforms (including macro-economic 
stabilization and price and trade liberalization), Arab governments have not succeeded in 
putting in place an environment conducive to a strong and sustainable growth of the 
private sector. Most private sector development indicators rank Arab countries behind the 
other regions of comparable income. Their ability to attract rising worldwide FDI flows 
in the nineties has also been week, despite the region’s high potential and its proximity to 
major OECD markets. 
 
The relatively poor overall performance of the private sector is a complex phenomenon 
and has therefore multiple causes.  While the investment climate constraints to business 
development in the Arab region are well documented in the several Business Climate 
Surveys of the World Bank and other national and international organizations, much less 
is known on other impediments to private sector development, such as the state of 
corporate ownership and the nature of corporate governance and its enforcement 
mechanisms.  
The purpose of this paper was to assess the state of corporate governance as a major 
factor affecting the growth performance of the private sector in MENA countries. For this 
purpose both country-specific assessments, carried out by World Bank-IMF teams (so-
called ROSC’s assessments) and focus-group discussions that took place in four regional 
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conferences have been synthesized. Strengths and weaknesses of corporate governance in 
selected Arab countries have been highlighted.  One major key finding is that the legal 
and regulatory frameworks of the assessed Arab countries are largely compliant with the 
OECD Principles of corporate governance. However, practices are not. The difficulty of 
the assessments is to reflect properly the discrepancies between the letter of the law and 
compliance. It should be emphasized that the World Bank-IMF assessments focus on 
listed companies. No-listed firms, specially SME and family-owned firms that make up to 
98% of all firms, are not subject to assessments. 
 
Another key finding that emerged from our reviewing of the regional conferences on 
corporate governance is that corporate governance issues have not been ignored in public 
debates in the MENA region. Practitioners from capital markets, banks, public and 
private sector representatives and other civil society groups have accepted the need to 
address corporate governance reforms as one of the crucial topics affecting the economic 
growth and development of firms, industries and whole economies in their region. 
Several meetings and conferences at the national and regional level have taken place. 
Appropriate and up-to-date recommendations regarding corporate governance reform in 
the MENA region have been adopted in those events. It is now up to the decision makers 
at all levels to implement those recommendations.       
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